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PERSISTENT FLAWS IN ECONOMETRIC
STUDIES OF THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF
THE DEATH PENALTY
James Alan Fox* and Michael L. Radelet**
The research of Stephen Layson' gives criminologists a strong feel-
ing of deja vu. Fifteen years ago, Isaac Ehrlich caught the criminological
community by surprise with the dramatic finding that each execution
could deter up to eight homicides.2 At that time, most criminologists
believed that deterrence research was fairly unequivocal-virtually none
of it showed that the threat of execution discouraged potential murder-
ers. The most unsettling feature of the initial aftermath of Ehrlich's find-
ings was that most death penalty scholars found themselves ill-equipped
to comprehend, much less evaluate, Ehrlich's sophisticated statistical ap-
proach. Thus, before more quantitatively capable critics could refute his
work,3 Ehrlich's conclusion had already influenced both popular and ju-
* Professor of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University.
** Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Florida.
In 1986, an earlier version of this paper was presented before the Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives. See Capital Punish-
ment: Hearings on H.R. 2837 and H.R. 343 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 334-47 (1985 & 1986) (prepared
statement of James Alan Fox, Persistent Flaws in Econometric Studies of the Death Penalty: A
Discussion of Layson's Findings).
1. Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Times-Series
Evidence, 52 S. ECON. J. 68 (1985).
2. See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397, 398 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehr-
lich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Barnett, Crime
and Capital Punishment: Some Recent Studies, 6 J. CRIM. JUST. 291 (1978); Beyleveld, Ehr-
lich's Analysis of Deterrence: Methodological Strategy and Ethics in Isaac Ehrlich's Research
and Writing on the Death Penalty as a Deterrent, 22 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 101 (1982); Bow-
ers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85
YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Friedman, The Use of Multiple Regression Analysis to Test for a Deter-
rent Effect of Capital Punishment: Prospects and Problems, in 1 CRIMINOLOGY REv. Y.B. 61,
61-87 (S. Mesinger & E. Bittner eds. 1979); Hoenack & Weiler, A Structural Model of Murder
Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 327 (1980); Hoenack, Kudrel
& Sjoquist, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Identification, 4 PoL'Y
ANALYSIS 491 (1978); Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An
Assessment of the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EF-
FECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin
eds. 1978); Lempert, The Effect of Executions on Homicide: A New Look in an Old Light, 29
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dicial thinking.'
Layson, a student of Ehrlich's,' now offers an even more dramatic
conclusion-that every execution deters as many as eighteen homicides.'
Unlike the divided public opinion on capital punishment in the mid-
1970s, the current public mood overwhelmingly favors the use of the
death penalty7 and would embrace a finding such as this.
Prior to Ehrlich's work, the principal methodology used to search
for possible deterrent effects of the death penalty was to compare homi-
cide rates in abolitionist and retentionist jurisdictions or homicide rates
in one jurisdiction before and after the introduction or abolition of the
death penalty.'
Ehrlich's innovative work brought a different methodology, taken
CRIME & DELINQ. 88 (1983); McGahey, Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet: Econometric Theory,
Econometrics, and the Death Penalty, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 485 (1980); Passell, The Deterrent
Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1975); Passell & Taylor,
The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445 (1977);
Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359
(1976). For Ehrlich's responses to these criticisms, see Ehrlich, On Positive Methodology, Eth-
ics, and Polemics in Deterrence Research, 22 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 124 (1982); Ehrlich, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 452 (1977); Ehrlich &
Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of
Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1977); Ehrlich & Mark, Fear of Deterrence: A Critical
Evaluation of the "Report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects," 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 293 (1977); Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209
(1975); Ehrlich, Rejoinder, 85 YALE L.J. 368 (1975); see also Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and
Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977).
4. For example, in 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty as then applied
was unconstitutional. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In 1976, one year after Ehr-
lich's study was published, the Court held that statutes could be constructed so that capital
punishment would be constitutionally permissible. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
For a discussion of the role of deterrence research in Gregg, see Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts:
The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical Research on Capital Punishment, in CHALLENG-
ING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 177, 181-82 (K.
Haas & J. Inciardi eds. 1988).
5. Capital Punishment: Hearings on H.R. 2837 and H.R. 343 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 311, 314
(1985 & 1986) (testimony of Stephen Layson) [hereinafter House Hearings].
6. See Layson, supra note 1, at 80 ("the tradeoff of executions for murders is approxi-
mately -18.5"). In an even bolder assertion than Layson's, James Yunker concluded that each
execution deters 156 homicides. See Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide?
Some Time Series Evidence, 5 J. BEHAV. ECoN. 45 (1976). This finding, however, has not been
taken seriously in death penalty debates because of significant methodological flaws in his
analysis. See Fox, The Identification and Estimation of Deterrence: An Evaluation of Yunker's
Model, 6 J. BEHAV. ECON. 225 (1977); Sesnowitz & McKee, On the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, 6 J. BEHAV. ECON. 217 (1977).
7. 244-45 THE GALLUP REPORT 10 (Jan.-Feb., 1986). Gallup's results indicate that
70% of the public supports the death penalty for murder, and 61% of the respondents believe
that the death penalty acts as a deterrent. See also infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
8. See, eg., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (T. Sellin ed. 1967).
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from the field of economics, to bear on this question. He examined the
effect of executions on national homicide rates between 1933-1969, hold-
ing constant certain demographic, socioeconomic, and criminal justice
variables that were also expected to influence homicide rates. Layson's
work used a similar methodology, but updated the Ehrlich analysis to
1977, examined different sets of explanatory variables, and attempted to
improve the measure of homicide rates.
Policy-makers, as well as many criminologists and legal scholars,
can be easily dazzled by the formidable equations which lend an air of
authority to Ehrlich's and Layson's work. However, we must carefully
inspect their work before we accept the conclusion that the death penalty
works as a deterrent.
I. THE ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO DETERRENCE
Given the extensive research devoted to the deterrence issue by no-
table scholars from Thorsten Sellin,9 one of America's most respected
criminologists, to Lawrence Klein,10 Nobel Prize-winning economist, we
would expect a clear answer to the question: Does the death penalty
deter murder and, if so, to what extent? The elusiveness of the answer
reflects the fact that no research design applicable to this question can
provide definitive proof one way or the other. We can never say that we
are absolutely positive the Loch Ness Monster does not exist; we can
only say that if it exists, we have not yet found it.
The most powerful research design-the randomized experiment-
may be used to study the effects of certain sanctions (e.g., income tax
audits), but not executions. A state cannot experiment with the death
penalty by executing all murderers from half of its counties, sentencing
murderers from other counties to imprisonment, and comparing the sub-
sequent homicide rates. As an alternative, some researchers have em-
ployed quasi-experimental designs, such as examining homicide rates
before and after the introduction or abolition of a death penalty statute. 1
However, this type of experimental design is vulnerable to contamination
by extraneous factors.
The econometric approach, used by Ehrlich and Layson among
9. See T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959) reprinted in MODEL PENAL CODE (Ten-
tative Draft No. 9, May 8, 1959); CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (T. Sellin ed. 1967); T. SELLIN, THE
PENALTY OF DEATH (1980).
10. See Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 3.
11. See, eg., Archer, Gartner & Beittel, Homicide and the Death Penalty: A Cross-Na-
tional Test of a Deterrence Hypothesis, 74 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 991 (1983); Fattah,
Canada's Successful Experience With the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 25 CAN. J. CRIMINOL-
OGY 421 (1983).
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others, instead attempts to identify a deterrent effect by measuring the
statistical association between the risk of execution and the homicide
rate. Whether the data are cross-sectional (e.g., cross-state variation in
homicide and execution rates) or longitudinal (e.g., trends in rates of
homicide and executions), the analyst strives to separate the effect of ex-
ecutions on homicide rates from the confounding effects of other
variables.12
Layson, like Ehrlich, used three sanction variables in regression
models explaining trends in the homicide rate. l" Specifically, while con-
trolling for a range of socioeconomic and demographic variables,14 Lay-
son estimated the association between the rate of homicide and (1) the
likelihood of arrest for homicide, (2) the likelihood of conviction given an
arrest for homicide, and, of greatest importance, (3) the likelihood of
execution given a conviction for homicide. 5
A correlation between the homicide rate and any one of the vari-
ables does not necessarily indicate causation; that the number of execu-
tions fell during the 1960s and 1970s while the homicide rate rose
sharply does not mean that the former caused the latter. Recognizing
that associations among variables may spuriously arise from extraneous
factors or common causes, the econometrician will include in his or her
model other important variables that reflect competing hypotheses for
explaining trends in homicide rates. The inclusion of one, two, or even a
dozen control variables does not guarantee the exclusion of spurious as-
sociations. To the contrary, many factors underlying the homicide rate
may be omitted either because they are not seen as being critical 16 or,
more commonly, because the data are unavailable. 7 Layson, in his anal-
ysis, considered as many as ten possible control variables;' 8 however, the
12. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 730-35
(1980).
13. Layson, supra note 1, at 70-71.
14. See infra note 18.
15. Layson, supra note 1, at 70-71.
16. Fisher, supra note 12, at 730.
17. Klein, Forst, & Filitov, supra note 3, at 345.
18. The ten control variables used by Layson in his analysis were labor force participation,
unemployment rate, per capita income, proportion of population non-white, proportion of
population belonging to a religion, proportion of families with husband and wife present, and
the population in the 14-24, 21-24, 25-29, and 21-29 age categories, all of which were expressed
in natural logarithms. See Layson, supra note 1, at 70, table I. Layson's data set also included
the percentage of the population that is male, government welfare payments, inflation, and
median years of schooling by males aged 25 years and over. See S. Layson, Data Sources for
"Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time Series Evidence"
(June 20, 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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validity of his findings are still in question because of omissions of both
types.
For example, the increased availability of guns may affect the homi-
cide rate both directly and indirectly.19 The presence of a gun can stimu-
late aggression.2 ° In addition, the use of a gun, as opposed to some other
weapon, would be more likely to make an assault lethal. 21 Besides its
greater lethality, the firearm distances the offender from his or her vic-
tim, making it easier, in a psychological sense, to take human life. Lack-
ing physical contact, killing can be as "easy" as shooting at objects in a
video game.
Cognizant of the biases that may result from excluding these impor-
tant variables, Layson responds by including a time trend variable22 as a
proxy for the host of omitted variables. However, this solution is unsatis-
factory. Although a linear time trend may adequately compensate for
social, economic, or political factors which have increased or decreased
linearly in rate, many critical factors have changed in a non-linear fash-
ion and thus are poorly represented by a simple, straight-line trend in
time.
Similarly, it is possible that the observed deterrent effect of execu-
tions may not suggest the impact of executions per se, but rather a more
general trend underlying the rate of execution. Perhaps the homicide
rate responds to the general "get tough" on crime posture. For example,
had a measure of prison terms for homicide been available, the same de-
terrent effect may have shown up with this sanction variable. In short,
capital punishment is but one way with which we sanction offenders, and
its apparent deterrent effect may simply reflect the sensitivity of offenders
to sanctions generally.
The factors and- conditions underlying homicide trends are many
and diverse; it is doubtful that the dozen that Layson considered span
this range. Additionally, factors that influenced the homicide rate in the
1930s are likely to be different from those which affected that rate in the
1970s. One approach to this problem is to include the rate of other
crimes as a control variable, since they react to many of the same causal
19. Kleck, Capital Punishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J. Soc. 882 (1979).
20. Berkowitz & LePage, Weapons as Aggression-Eliciting Stimuli, 7 J. PERSONALrrY &
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 202, 206 (1967).
21. Kleck, supra note 19, at 893.
22. A time trend variable is an integer starting at 1 -for the first annual observation and
increasing by I for each additional year during the study period. Layson, for example, defined
his time trend variable as "1" for 1933 through "45" for 1977. See Layson, supra note 1, at 70,
table I. Time trend variables account for any linear trend that would have been captured by
variables that were omitted or unavailable because of lack of data.
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factors. Klein, Forst, and Filatov found, for example, that when the rate
of crimes other than homicide was included as a control variable, the
deterrent effect weakened and became insignificant.23 Curiously, Layson
did not use the data on other crimes, though the data were available and
the results of Klein, Forst, and Filatov's work are certainly instructive.
The presence of substantial multicollinearity in the data complicates
the task of finding the best specification, i.e., the best combination of vari-
ables to use in the model.24 The variables are strongly intercorrelated,
some over 0.95, which makes the coefficients of the model unreliable and
highly dependent on the model specification.
To his credit, Layson performed a specification analysis of his re-
sults, estimating several alternative models.2" However, his crude classi-
fication (whether coefficients were positive or negative and whether
significant or not) obscured the instability of many of the coefficients be-
tween models. Given the instability, one cannot comfortably endorse
any particular specification.
To be sure, econometric techniques are invaluable for many model-
ing and forecasting problems. For example, econometric methods have
successfully forecasted the national crime rate.26 In that case, whether
the variables included in the model were the proper ones was secondary
to whether the model forecasted accurately.
Econometric methods are tricky, however, when used to establish
causal links through data analysis; a solid theoretical foundation is es-
sential in order to develop and test causal models. With highly aggre-
gated analyses such as Layson's, almost any specification will fit the data
well. All four of Layson's alternative specifications27 had R-squared val-
23. Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 3, at 355-56.
24. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more predictors are so strongly intercorrelated
that the regression procedure has difficulty separating the unique effects of each variable. As a
result, whatever coefficients obtained are unstable or unreliable because they can change sub-
stantially with minor modifications in specification. The stability of the regression hyper-plane
depends on the extent to which the predictor variables are orthogonal (uncorrelated) or ob-
lique (correlated). As an analogy, consider a table top mounted on a single pole which is
supported by a base of two crossed legs. If the legs are perpendicular (uncorrelated), the table
is stable; if the legs are oblique (correlated), the table can wobble. Like the table top, the
regression hyper-plane becomes more unstable as the legs (the variables) are increasingly
correlated.
25. The specification analysis estimates homicide rates with several different combinations
of predictor variables. Layson estimated the effect of five variables in 210 different equations,
and the effects of 10 other variables in 84 different equations. See Layson, supra note 1, at 78,
table V.
26. See, eg., J.A. Fox, FORECASTING CRIME DATA-AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
(1978).
27. See Layson, supra note 1, at 76, table IV, equations 16-19.
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ues over ninety-nine percent;28 however, so would most any specification
of ten variables, no matter how absurd. 9 In fact, one would be hard-
pressed to find a ten-variable equation that does not fit well.
Economic models, which are grounded in well-developed macro-
economic theory, are generally fairly large, involving multiple equations
and numerous exogenous variables. In contrast, not only is our under-
standing of the macro-dynamics of homicide minimal at best, but one
simply cannot feel very secure about a single-equation model like Lay-
son's having a dozen variables chosen somewhat arbitrarily.
Caution is always advised in interpreting coefficients and elasticities
in causal terms. But when the issue is as critical as the death penalty, the
results of econometric analysis may never be sufficiently unambiguous to
recommend policy.
II. DATA QUALITY
Unlike psychologists and sociologists, for whom reliability, validity,
and operationalization of measures are fundamental concerns, econo-
mists seem to assume a much more relaxed position on this matter. In-
deed, while the use of proxies for unavailable measures is customary in
econometrics, a sociologist might be bitterly criticized for using inexact
measures unless the measures can be shown to be reliable and valid in-
dicators of the variable of interest.
It is to Layson's credit, therefore, that his primary objective in un-
dertaking this research was to replicate earlier analyses using a more ap-
propriate measure of homicide. Given the criticisms concerning the
28. R-squared is "the percentage of variation in the dependent variable that is accounted
for by all of the explanatory variables." Rubenfeld and Steiner, Quantitive Methods in Anti-
trust Litigation, 46 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 100 (1983). In other words, the higher
the R-squared value is, the better we can account for changes in the dependent variable caused
by the explanatory variables used. For example, if the R-squared of the change in the homi-
cide rate is 99%, then 99% of the change can be accounted for by the variables which were
used to determine what caused the change (such as access to handguns, prison terms, the death
penalty, etc.).
29. In place of the five or six control variables used by Layson in his final specification
(equations 16-19 in Layson's table IV), we simply use a fifth degree orthogonal polynomial as a
control for the arrest, conviction, and execution sanction variables. (See Layson, supra note 1,
for table IV, equations 16-19). The orthogonal polynomial is substantively meaningless, yet it
is statistically desirable since the five terms are uncorrelated. While we do not suggest this
specification to be theoretically relevant, it is certainly noteworthy that this "nonsense" specifi-
cation (with R-squared of 0.994) fits the homicide variable nearly as well as Layson's best four
equations.
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coverage of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)30 in its earlier years,31
Layson chose Vital Statistics 32 as his source of homicide data.
Unfortunately, Layson did not employ the same scrutiny with re-
gard to his other measures-particularly his sanction variables. To be
blunt, the disposition data-persons charged and persons convicted-are
of such poor quality that they are useless for research purposes. This
data series was discontinued from the UCR program as of 1978 because
of its poor quality.33 In 1977, for example, only fourteen percent of the
United States population was represented in reports by those agencies
that submitted disposition data.34 The quality of the disposition data is
even worse for the early years of the UCR program in the 1930s.
31
Moreover, Bowers and Pierce36 show that the mix of jurisdictions
that have supplied disposition data has been far from consistent over
time, thus creating a serious bias in those time series.37 Also, one may
not reasonably assume that those agencies that did provide disposition
data were representative of the United States as a whole. Thus, one can-
not say what the probability of conviction and probability of execution
really measure, if anything, when used as variables in a regression model.
The use of this disposition data was a fatal flaw in Layson's findings, as it
would be in any analysis that takes the disposition data seriously.
III. TIME PERIOD
One of the major criticisms of Ehrlich's research is that the deter-
rent effect disappears when data from the years following 1962 are re-
moved from the analysis.38 In other words, the negative association
observed by Ehrlich had been produced during an era-beginning in
1963-when the homicide rate was rising sharply and executions were
30. For a description of Uniform Crime Reports, see Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports:
A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 708, 708-17 (1963).
31. See, eg., Bowers & Pierce, supra note 3, at 188-89.
32. To count homicides, Layson used the following sources: For 1933-1936, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MORTALITY STATISTICS (1933-36); for 1937-1945,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1937-45); for 1946-1977, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, U.S.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES (1946-77). See Lay-
son, supra note 18, at 1.
33. Perhaps this explains why the data series used in Layson's analysis ended with 1977.
34. 1977 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REP. 281, table 56.
35. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 3, at 188.
36. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 3.
37. Id. at 188-91. Disposition data were filed annually using a different form than that for
crimes known. It was possible, therefore, for these data to be seriously flawed, while the
monthly data on "crimes known" were adequate.
38. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 3, at 197-98.
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becoming exceptionally rare. Further, while advocates of the death pen-
alty might view the 1960s wave of murder as "obviously" due to the lack
of executions, all crimes, capital and non-capital, were on the rise during
this time period.39
Layson anticipated this criticism and performed the Chow test4 to
determine if structural shifts existed over the time period he studied.41
He failed to reject the hypothesis of no structural shifts.42
However, this hardly settles the issue. First, failing to reject an hy-
pothesis does not mean that it is proven, only that it is retained. The
power of the test may not be sufficient to detect a change, had there been
one. Moreover, the Chow test is an overall test of the model based on
degree of fit.43 The degree of fit may not change significantly over time
even though one or more regression coefficients do change.
In Layson's research, the key variable is the probability of execution
given conviction. Figure 1 (see Appendix B) shows a scatterplot of homi-
cide (Q) and the probability of execution (PE3), which reveals a V-
39. Ehrlich's and Layson's work, as with most deterrence studies, used data that preceded
the temporary moratorium on the death penalty between 1967 and 1977. While only a few
studies have examined later data, those that have done so have continued to find no deterrent
effect from the threat of execution.
The first examination of the deterrent effect of post-Furman executions searched for ef-
fects on the homicide rate from the first four post-Furman executions. McFarland, Is Capital
Punishment a Short-Term Deterrent to Homicide? A Study of the Effects of Four Recent Ameri-
can Executions, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1983). Homicides did decrease in Utah
following the execution of Gary Gilmore in 1977, but McFarland shows this decline resulted
from atypical inclement weather, not from the execution. Id. at 1030. After the other three
executions (John Spenkelink, Florida, May 25, 1979; Jesse Bishop, Nevada, October 22, 1979;
Steven Judy, Indiana, March 9, 1981), no corresponding decline in homicides occurred. Id. at
1021.
Bailey and Peterson looked at murders of police officers and police employees from 1973-
1984, finding that rates were highest over the first four years, but have generally and steadily
declined since. Bailey & Peterson, Police Killings and Capital Punishment: The Post-Furman
Period, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1987). "Not for a single year was evidence found that police are
safer in jurisdictions that provide for capital punishment. Nor did the analysis produce a
single instance where higher levels of death sentences are associated significantly with lower
rates of police killings." Id. at 22. Later, using both contiguous state matching and multiple
regression to assess the relationship between capital punishment and homicide rates over the
same time period, Peterson and Bailey similarly found no corresponding decline in homicides.
Peterson & Bailey, Murder and Capital Punishment in the Evolving Context of the Post-
Furman Era, 66 Soc. FORCEs 774 (1988).
40. The Chow test, a procedure for testing the equality of two sets of regression coeffi-
cients, can be used for determining if a regression model estimated for one time period is
different from that estimated for a second time period. Chow, Tests of Equality Between Sets of
Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions, 28 ECONOMETRICA 591 (1960).
41. Layson, supra note 1, at 83.
42. Id.
43. Chow, supra note 40.
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shaped pattern. Upon further examination, the positive slope corre-
sponds to the years prior to 1957, and the negative slope represents the
years since 1957.
Since the Chow test is a global test, it may not have been sufficiently
sensitive to this type of change. A more appropriate test would focus
only on the key execution variable. We have estimated a number of spec-
ifications of the model, adding in a dummy interaction term to measure
change in slope for the risk of execution (PE3). For most of the equa-
tions, the negative shift in slope after 1957 is significant, and for some,
the slope for executions prior to 1957 is not.
Adding this dummy interaction term into Layson's equations
reduces the magnitude and significance of the effect of execution risk for
the years 1936-1957, when executions were actually being performed
with some regularity. Specifically, as displayed in Table 1 (see Appendix
A), the regression coefficient for the risk of execution variable (PE3), esti-
mated by Layson as -0.103, 4 changes substantially to -0.064 when the
slope shift dummy is added. The change indicates that the association
between the risk of execution and the rate of homicide, holding the other
factors constant, is far from stable between the pre-1960 and post-1960
eras. Using this more sensitive and direct approach, we must question
Layson's confidence that structural shifts do not underlie his results.
Because Layson's specifications were plagued with problems of mul-
ticollinearity, we used orthogonal polynomials to reestimate his equa-
tions. The results show that Layson's pre-1957 effect of executions
changes sign and that the post-1957 dummy slopes contain the entire
negative association that Layson mistakingly interpreted as a deterrent
effect. Thus, much-if not most-of the negative association between
the risk of execution and the rate of homicide is a result of the post-1957
era when, coincidently, executions decreased while homicides increased,
and not necessarily because of each other (see Figure 2, Appendix B).
IV. NEGATIVE BIAS
Several potential problems arise because the number of homicides
appears in the numerator of the dependent variable (i.e., the homicide
rate Q) and in the denominators of the sanction variables (e.g.,
probability of execution PE3). As has been pointed out in regard to Ehr-
lich's research, measurement error in the number of homicides will pro-
duce an artificial negative association-or a negative bias-in the
44. Layson, supra note 1, at 76, table IV, equation 16.
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coefficient of execution risk.45 For example, if a few homicides were ran-
domly added in (or subtracted), the homicide ratio would increase (de-
crease) and the probability of execution would decrease (increase);
therefore, the coefficient of the execution rate would shift negatively.
Layson used Vital Statistics to obtain data on the number of homi-
cides, as UCR's poor coverage of homicides in the early years could pro-
duce bias.4 6 Although it may be argued that the Vital Statistics measure
of homicides is an improvement over the UCR measure, the Vital Statis-
tics measure is not infallible. Indeed, suicides and accidental deaths can
be improperly classified as homicides, and persons who are abducted and
killed may be erroneously considered missing and therefore left out of the
figures. In addition, the number of homicides committed by a multiple
murderer will be reflected repeatedly in the denominator of the execution
variable, biasing the coefficient downward. Of course, the multiple mur-
derer cannot be executed multiple times.
In addition to these sources of error, homicide is improperly defined.
In Layson's work, Q (the homicide rate) includes both capital and non-
capital killings, as data that attempt to differentiate the two categories of
homicide are non-existent. Whatever the deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment is for capital homicide (premeditated murder), a large propor-
tion of the reported homicides are manslaughters, which are generally
not deterrable because they are either provoked or unpremeditated. 7
As with measurement error, the inclusion of these non-capital
crimes in the numerator of Q and the denominator of PE3 pushes the
estimated deterrent effect of the death penalty in the negative direction."
We do not have data available at this point to estimate the model only for
capital crimes. Still, any estimated deterrent effect should be adjusted for
the inclusion of non-capital crimes.
V. AGGREGATION BIAS
The econometric approach is designed for modeling macro trends in
society. Unfortunately, criminologists do not have a sound macro-theory
45. See, e.g., Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 3, at 347-49.
46. Layson, supra note 1, at 73.
47. Bailey, Disaggregation in Deterrence and Death Penalty Research: The Case of Murder
in Chicago, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 831-32 (1983).
48. This negative bias would not arise if the ratio of capital to non-capital homicides re-
mained constant over time. This is most likely not the case, however. For example, in recent
years the percentage of stranger-to-stranger homicides has been growing. This would suggest
that the proportion of capital homicides may also be increasing. M. DIETZ, KILLING FOR
PROFIT 3-12 (1988).
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of homicide.49 The theory of deterrence is, on the other hand, based on
the thinking of individuals, i.e., micro-theory. The bias of measuring
micro-relations with macro-data is well known, yet some observers tend
to lose sight of this in the area of deterrence. To presume that a potential
killer in Oregon may be deterred by an execution in Georgia is rather
unreasonable. Nevertheless, it is an assumption implicit when inferring
micro-level relationships from macro-level associations.
Not only does the use of nationally aggregated data ignore cross-
state variation in the risk of execution, but it also ignores the fact that
offenders have different perceptions and reactions to sanctions. Many
potential murderers who would alter their behavior because of the risk of
execution might also respond to changes in imprisonment rates or the
average length of incarceration for murder. At the other extreme, those
killers who perhaps are the most likely to be executed under current
death penalty statutes, such as serial killers like Gacy, Bundy, and
Buono, are the least deterrable because of their sociopathic character.50
As to these cold-impassioned killers-the ones for whom the death sen-
tence is perhaps tailored-little can be done to compensate for their lack
of internal controls.
VI. MISINTERPRETATION OF LAYSON'S FINDINGS
The above problems aside, Layson's work has been misinterpreted
and used to exaggerate the deterrent effect of the death penalty even be-
yond what Layson concluded. For example, in 1987, Bedau and Radelet
documented 350 twentieth century cases in American jurisdictions in
which innocent defendants were convicted of homicide or sentenced to
death for rape.5" Attorney General Edwin Meese requested that his staff
prepare a response. 2 Stephen Markman (the author of the Justice De-
partment response) and Paul Cassell expanded the response to include
49. Brenner makes such an attempt. See ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1946---THIRTETH ANNIVERSARY REVIEW, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PAPER No. 5 (Comm. Print 1976) (Brenner, Estimating the Social Costs of
National Economic Policy: Implications for Mental and Physical Health, and CriminalAggres-
sion); ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE ON NATIONAL HEALTH AND SO-
CIAL WELL-BEING, STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC GOALS AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS,
(Comm. Print 1984) (Brenner).
50. For a discussion of capital punishment in relation to serial killers, see J. LEVIN & J. A.
Fox, MASS MURDER: AMERICA'S GROWING MENACE (1985).
51. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 21 (1987).
52. Bedau & Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41
STAN. L. REV. 161, 161 n.1 (1988).
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Layson's work and published it in the Stanford Law Review. 53 The es-
sence of the Markman and Cassell article is that the Bedau-Radelet study
"gives excessive weight to the slight risk of erroneous executions," and
that it fails to "consider the countervailing benefits of capital punish-
ment."54 In buttressing the latter point, Markman and Cassell use Lay-
son's work to estimate that 125,000 murders have been deterred by
capital punishment in America this century.55
The Markman and Cassell article provides a clear example of how
research such as Layson's can be uncritically accepted-and even exag-
gerated-to support a preordained conclusion. Layson studied the pe-
riod 1933-1977.56 To arrive at their estimate of homicides deterred,
Markman and Cassell used Layson's finding that each execution deterred
eighteen homicides, and multiplied it by 7092, the number of executions
in America during the first eighty-five years of this century.
57
This extrapolation is preposterous. Even Layson admitted that the
deterrent effect he claimed to have found existed only during the last
fifteen years of the period he studied, and in eight of those years there
were no executions. As Layson stated, "[i]f I exclude all the data [after]
1960, I do find that evidence for the deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment is very weak" or even "nonexistent." 58
VII. CONCLUSION
We have omitted other methodological issues, such as simultaneity
and functional forms, from this review of Layson's paper. The problems
discussed above are sufficiently formidable and noteworthy, and we do
not wish to cloud the discussion of these significant concerns with what
are perhaps statistical quibbles. We will, nevertheless, mention one mi-
nor issue as a way of concluding, because it represents the fundamental
problem with this approach to studying deterrence.
Three competing functional forms for the model were considered by
53. Markman & Cassell, Protecting the Innocent. A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study,
41 STAN. L. REv. 121, 155 (1988).
54. Id. at 145.
55. Id. at 156.
56. While the full observation period in Layson's data spans 1933-1977, Layson only ana-
lyzed observations for 1936-1977 because of a three-year lag in the sanction variables.
57. Markman & Cassell, supra note 53, at 156 n.214. Later, Markman and Cassell multi-
ply 125,000 by 0.25 to arrive at the conclusion that even if a 25% possibility exists that Lay-
son's figures are correct, then 31,250 lives would have been saved by capital punishment
between 1900-1985. Id. at 156 n.215. This logic is equivalent to supposing that if the chances
of a nuclear bomb falling on New York City were 0.25, then we could plan on only a quarter of
the population being killed if indeed a bomb were dropped.
58. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 316 (testimony of Stephen Layson).
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Layson: linear, semi-log, and log-linear. Layson decided in favor of a
log-linear form, not because any theory of deterrence dictates it, but be-
cause a statistical test-the Box-Cox analysis,59 which is unrelated to
criminological theory-endorses it.' Although we do not question the
propriety of the test, we do question whether this test is the best way to
approach such a weighty issue as measuring the deterrent effect of capital
punishment.
The lack of macro-theory to guide model building, combined with a
host of difficult methodological problems-measurement error, aggrega-
tion bias, temporal shifts, and causal ambiguity-makes the prospects
bleak for econometric studies of deterrence. Brier and Fienberg, in their
well-respected review of the econometric literature on deterrence, con-
cluded that "little or no progress has been made during the past [ten]
years in our understanding of the potential deterrent effects of punish-
ment on crime."61 We must conclude that Layson's findings add nothing
to our understanding.
None of these criticisms should suggest any deficiency in Professor
Layson's technical skill. Even the most expert econometrician could not
derive reliable estimates of the deterrent effect of capital punishment
from these data and with this approach. Indeed, the application of
econometric techniques to deterrence is as arbitrary as the application of
the death penalty, 62 and certainly offers nothing to guide policy.
59. Box & Cox, An Analysis of Transformations, 26 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y, Ser. B,
211 (1964).
60. Layson, supra note 1, at 87.
61. Brier & Fienberg, Recent Econometric Modeling of Crime and Punishment: Support
for the Deterrence Hypothesis? 4 EVALUATION REv. 147, 187 (1980).
62. See, e.g., S. GROSS & R. MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARI-
TIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES WITH SLOPE-SHIFT DUMMY
(t-values in parentheses)
Layson's Equation
Independent Original Modified with Orthogonal








Labor Force Part (LFP)
Income (Y)
Percent Nonwhite (NW)
First Degree Term (P1)
Second Degree Term (P2)
Third Degree Term (P3)
Fourth Degree Term (P4)








































Estimated Rho -0.272 -
R-squared 0.996
'All variables, except for TT and PI through P5, are in logs.
b Estimates are corrected for autocorrelation.
Estimates with t-values over 2.0 are statistically significant.
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APPENDIX B
FIGURE 1: SCATTERPLOT OF EXECUTION AND HOMICIDE RATES
1936-1956
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FIGURE 2: TRENDS IN EXECUTION AND HOMICIDE RATES, 1936-77
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